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14 <PRE> |
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15 <!-- Manpage converted by man2html 3.0.1 --> |
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16 <B><A HREF="dcc.html">DCC(8)</A></B> Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse <B><A HREF="dcc.html">DCC(8)</A></B> |
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17 |
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18 |
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19 </PRE> |
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20 <H2><A NAME="NAME">NAME</A></H2><PRE> |
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21 <B>DCC</B> -- Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse |
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22 |
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23 |
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24 </PRE> |
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25 <H2><A NAME="DESCRIPTION">DESCRIPTION</A></H2><PRE> |
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26 The Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse or <B>DCC</B> is a cooperative, distrib- |
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27 uted system intended to detect "bulk" mail or mail sent to many people. |
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28 It allows individuals receiving a single mail message to determine that |
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29 many other people have received essentially identical copies of the mes- |
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30 sage and so reject or discard the message. |
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31 |
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32 Source for the server, client, and utilities is available at Rhyolite |
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33 Software, LLC, http://www.rhyolite.com/dcc/ It is free for organizations |
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34 that do not sell spam or virus filtering services. |
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35 |
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36 <A NAME="How-the-DCC-Is-Used"><B>How the DCC Is Used</B></A> |
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37 The DCC can be viewed as a tool for end users to enforce their right to |
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38 "opt-in" to streams of bulk mail by refusing bulk mail except from |
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39 sources in a "whitelist." Whitelists are the responsibility of DCC |
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40 clients, since only they know which bulk mail they solicited. |
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41 |
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42 False positives or mail marked as bulk by a DCC server that is not bulk |
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43 occur only when a recipient of a message reports it to a DCC server as |
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44 having been received many times or when the "fuzzy" checksums of differ- |
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45 ing messages are the same. The fuzzy checksums ignore aspects of mes- |
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46 sages in order to compute identical checksums for substantially identical |
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47 messages. The fuzzy checksums are designed to ignore only differences |
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48 that do not affect meanings. So in practice, you do not need to worry |
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49 about DCC false positive indications of "bulk," but not all bulk mail is |
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50 unsolicited bulk mail or spam. You must either use whitelists to distin- |
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51 guish solicited from unsolicited bulk mail or only use DCC indications of |
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52 "bulk" as part of a scoring system such as SpamAssassin. Besides unso- |
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53 licited bulk email or spam, bulk messages include legitimate mail such as |
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54 order confirmations from merchants, legitimate mailing lists, and empty |
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55 or test messages. |
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56 |
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57 A DCC server estimates the number copies of a message by counting check- |
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58 sums reported by DCC clients. Each client must decide which bulk mes- |
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59 sages are unsolicited and what degree of "bulkiness" is objectionable. |
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60 Client DCC software marks, rejects, or discards mail that is bulk accord- |
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61 ing to local thresholds on target addresses from DCC servers and unso- |
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62 licited according to local whitelists. |
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63 |
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64 DCC servers are usually configured to receive reports from as many tar- |
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65 gets as possible, including sources that cannot be trusted to not exag- |
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66 gerate the number of copies of a message they see. A user of a DCC |
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67 client angry about receiving a message could report it with 1,000,000 |
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68 separate DCC reports or with a single report claiming 1,000,000 targets. |
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69 An unprincipled user could subscribe a "spam trap" to mailing lists such |
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70 as those of the IETF or CERT. Such abuses of the system area not prob- |
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71 lems, because much legitimate mail is "bulk." You cannot reject bulk |
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72 mail unless you have a whitelist of sources of legitimate bulk mail. |
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73 |
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74 DCC can also be used by an Internet service provider to detect bulk mail |
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75 coming from its own customers. In such circumstances, the DCC client |
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76 might be configured to only log bulk mail from unexpected (not |
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77 whitelisted) customers. |
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78 |
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79 <A NAME="What-the-DCC-Is"><B>What the DCC Is</B></A> |
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80 A DCC server accumulates counts of cryptographic checksums of messages |
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81 but not the messages themselves. It exchanges reports of frequently seen |
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82 checksums with other servers. DCC clients send reports of checksums |
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83 related to incoming mail to a nearby DCC server running <B><A HREF="dccd.html">dccd(8)</A></B>. Each |
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84 report from a client includes the number of recipients for the message. |
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85 A DCC server accumulates the reports and responds to clients the the cur- |
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86 rent total number of recipients for each checksum. The client adds an |
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87 SMTP header to incoming mail containing the total counts. It then dis- |
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88 cards or rejects mail that is not whitelisted and has counts that exceed |
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89 local thresholds. |
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90 |
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91 A special value of the number of addressees is "MANY" and means it is |
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92 certain that this message was bulk and might be unsolicited, perhaps |
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93 because it came from a locally blacklisted source or was addressed to an |
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94 invalid address or "spam trap." The special value "MANY" is merely the |
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95 largest value that fits in the fixed sized field containing the count of |
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96 addressees. That "infinity" accumulated total can be reached with mil- |
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97 lions of independent reports as well as with one or two. |
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98 |
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99 DCC servers <I>flood</I> or send reports of checksums of bulk mail to neighbor- |
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100 ing servers. |
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101 |
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102 To keep a server's database of checksums from growing without bound, |
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103 checksums are forgotten when they become old. Checksums of bulk mail are |
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104 kept longer. See <B><A HREF="dbclean.html">dbclean(8)</A></B>. |
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105 |
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106 DCC clients pick the nearest working DCC server using a small shared or |
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107 memory mapped file, <I>@prefix@/map</I>. It contains server names, port num- |
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108 bers, passwords, recent performance measures, and so forth. This file |
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109 allows clients to use quick retransmission timeouts and to waste little |
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110 time on servers that have temporarily stopped working or become unreach- |
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111 able. The utility program <B><A HREF="cdcc.html">cdcc(8)</A></B> is used to maintain this file as well |
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112 as to check the health of servers. |
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113 |
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114 <A NAME="X-DCC-Headers"><B>X-DCC Headers</B></A> |
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115 The DCC software includes several programs used by clients. <B><A HREF="dccm.html">Dccm(8)</A></B> uses |
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116 the sendmail "milter" interface to query a DCC server, add header lines |
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117 to incoming mail, and reject mail whose total checksum counts are high. |
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118 Dccm is intended to be run with SMTP servers using sendmail. |
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119 |
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120 <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">Dccproc(8)</A></B> adds header lines to mail presented by file name or <I>stdin</I>, but |
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121 relies on other programs such as procmail to deal with mail with large |
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122 counts. <B><A HREF="dccsight.html">Dccsight(8)</A></B> is similar but deals with previously computed check- |
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123 sums. |
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124 |
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125 <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">Dccifd(8)</A></B> is similar to dccproc but is not run separately for each mail |
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126 message and so is far more efficient. It receives mail messages via a |
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127 socket somewhat like dccm, but with a simpler protocol that can be used |
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128 by Perl scripts or other programs. |
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129 |
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130 DCC SMTP header lines are of one of the forms: |
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131 |
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132 X-DCC-brand-Metrics: client server-ID; bulk cknm1=count cknm2=count ... |
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133 X-DCC-brand-Metrics: client; whitelist |
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134 where |
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135 <I>whitelist</I> appears if the global or per-user <I>whiteclnt</I> file marks the |
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136 message as good. |
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137 <I>brand</I> is the "brand name" of the DCC server, such as "RHYOLITE". |
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138 <I>client</I> is the name or IP address of the DCC client that added the |
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139 header line to the SMTP message. |
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140 <I>server-ID</I> is the numeric ID of the DCC server that the DCC client con- |
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141 tacted. |
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142 <I>bulk</I> is present if one or more checksum counts exceeded the DCC |
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143 client's thresholds to make the message "bulky." |
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144 <I>bulk</I> <I>rep</I> is present if the DCC reputation of the IP address of the |
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145 sender is bad. |
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146 <I>cknm1</I>,<I>cknm2</I>,... are types of checksums: |
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147 <I>IP</I> address of SMTP client |
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148 <I>env</I><B>_</B><I>From</I> SMTP envelope value |
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149 <I>From</I> SMTP header line |
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150 <I>Message-ID</I> SMTP header line |
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151 <I>Received</I> last Received: header line in the SMTP message |
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152 <I>substitute</I> SMTP header line chosen by the DCC client, pre- |
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153 fixed with the name of the header |
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154 <I>Body</I> SMTP body ignoring white-space |
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155 <I>Fuz1</I> filtered or "fuzzy" body checksum |
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156 <I>Fuz2</I> another filtered or "fuzzy" body checksum |
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157 <I>rep</I> DCC reputation of the mail sender or the esti- |
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158 mated probability that the message is bulk. |
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159 Counts for <I>IP</I>, <I>env</I><B>_</B><I>From</I>, <I>From</I>, <I>Message-Id</I>, <I>Received</I>, and |
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160 <I>substitute</I> checksums are omitted by the DCC client if the |
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161 server says it has no information. Counts for <I>Fuz1</I> and <I>Fuz2</I> |
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162 are omitted if the message body is empty or contains too lit- |
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163 tle of the right kind of information for the checksum to be |
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164 computed. |
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165 <I>count</I> is the total number of recipients of messages with that check- |
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166 sum reported directly or indirectly to the DCC server. The |
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167 special count "MANY" means that DCC client have claimed that |
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168 the message is directed at millions of recipients. "MANY" |
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169 imples the message is definitely bulk, but not necessarily |
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170 unsolicited. The special counts "OK" and "OK2" mean the |
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171 checksum has been marked "good" or "half-good" by DCC servers. |
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172 |
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173 <A NAME="Mailing-lists"><B>Mailing lists</B></A> |
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174 Legitimate mailing list traffic differs from spam only in being solicited |
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175 by recipients. Each client should have a private whitelist. |
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176 |
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177 DCC whitelists can also mark mail as unsolicited bulk using blacklist |
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178 entries for commonly forged values such as "From: user@public.com". |
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179 |
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180 <A NAME="White-and-Blacklists"><B>White and Blacklists</B></A> |
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181 DCC server and client whitelist files share a common format. Server |
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182 files are always named <I>whitelist</I> and one is required to be in the DCC |
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183 home directory with the other server files. Client whitelist files are |
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184 named <I>whiteclnt</I> in the DCC home directory or a subdirectory specified |
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185 with the <B>-U</B> option for <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B>. They specify mail that should not be |
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186 reported to a DCC server or that is always unsolicited and almost cer- |
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187 tainly bulk. |
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188 |
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189 A DCC whitelist file contains blank lines, comments starting with "#", |
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190 and lines of the following forms: |
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191 <I>include</I> <I>file</I> |
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192 Copies the contents of <I>file</I> into the whitelist. It can occur |
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193 only in the main whitelist or whiteclnt file and not in an |
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194 included file. The file name should be absolute or relative to |
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195 the DCC home directory. |
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196 |
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197 <I>count</I> <I>value</I> |
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198 lines specify checksums that should be white- or blacklisted. |
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199 <I>count</I> <I>env</I><B>_</B><I>From</I> <I>821-path</I> |
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200 <I>count</I> <I>env</I><B>_</B><I>To</I> <I>dest-mailbox</I> |
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201 <I>count</I> <I>From</I> <I>822-mailbox</I> |
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202 <I>count</I> <I>Message-ID</I> <I><string></I> |
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203 <I>count</I> <I>Received</I> <I>string</I> |
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204 <I>count</I> <I>Substitute</I> <I>header</I> <I>string</I> |
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205 <I>count</I> <I>Hex</I> <I>ctype</I> <I>cksum</I> |
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206 <I>count</I> <I>ip</I> <I>IP-address</I> |
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207 |
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208 <I>MANY</I> <I>value</I> |
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209 indicates that millions of targets have received messages |
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210 with the header, IP address, or checksum <I>value</I>. |
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211 <I>OK</I> <I>value</I> |
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212 <I>OK2</I> <I>value</I> |
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213 say that messages with the header, IP address, or check- |
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214 sum <I>value</I> are OK and should not reported to DCC servers |
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215 or be greylisted. <I>OK2</I> says that the message is "half |
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216 OK." Two <I>OK2</I> checksums associated with a message are |
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217 equivalent to one <I>OK</I>. |
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218 A DCC server never shares or <I>floods</I> reports containing |
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219 checksums marked in its whitelist with OK or OK2 to other |
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220 servers. A DCC client does not report or ask its server |
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221 about messages with a checksum marked OK or OK2 in the |
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222 client whitelist. This is intended to allow a DCC client |
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223 to keep private mail so private that even its checksums |
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224 are not disclosed. |
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225 <I>MX</I> <I>IP-address-or-hostname</I> |
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226 <I>MXDCC</I> <I>IP-address-or-hostname</I> |
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227 mark an address or block of addresses of trust mail |
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228 relays including MX servers, smart hosts, and bastion or |
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229 DMZ relays. The DCC clients <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>, and |
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230 <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B> parse and skip initial Received: headers added |
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231 by listed MX servers to determine the external sources of |
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232 mail messages. Unsolicited bulk mail that has been for- |
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233 warded through listed addresses is discarded by <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B> |
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234 and <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B> as if with <B>-a</B> <I>DISCARD</I> instead of rejected. |
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235 <I>MXDCC</I> marks addresses that are MX servers that run DCC |
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236 clients. The checksums for a mail message that has been |
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237 forwarded through an address listed as MXDCC queried |
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238 instead of reported. |
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239 <I>SUBMIT</I> <I>IP-address-or-hostname</I> |
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240 marks an IP address or block addresses of SMTP submission |
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241 clients such as web browsers that cannot tolerate 4yz |
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242 temporary rejections but that cannot be trusted to not |
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243 send spam. Since they are local addresses, DCC Reputa- |
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244 tions are not computed for them. |
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245 |
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246 <I>value</I> in <I>count</I> <I>value</I> lines can be |
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247 <I>dest-mailbox</I> |
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248 is an RFC 821 address or a local user name. |
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249 <I>821-path</I> |
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250 is an RFC 821 address. |
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251 <I>822-mailbox</I> |
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252 is an RFC 822 address with optional name. |
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253 <I>Substitute</I> <I>header</I> |
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254 is the name of an SMTP header such as "Sender" or the |
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255 name of one of two SMTP envlope values, "HELO," or |
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256 "Mail_Host" for the resolved host name from the <I>821-path</I> |
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257 in the message. |
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258 <I>Hex</I> <I>ctype</I> <I>cksum</I> |
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259 starts with the string <I>Hex</I> followed a checksum type, and |
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260 a string of four hexadecimal numbers obtained from a DCC |
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261 log file or the <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B> command using <B>-CQ</B>. The check- |
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262 sum type is <I>body</I>, <I>Fuz1</I>, or <I>Fuz2</I> or one of the preceding |
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263 checksum types such as <I>env</I><B>_</B><I>From</I>. |
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264 <I>IP-address</I> |
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265 is a host name, IPv4 or IPv6 address, or a block of IP |
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266 addresses in the standard xxx/mm from with mm limited for |
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267 server whitelists to 16 for IPv4 or 112 for IPv6. There |
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268 can be at most 64 CIDR blocks in a client <I>whiteclnt</I> file. |
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269 A host name is converted to IP addresses with DNS, |
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270 <I>/etc/hosts</I> or other mechanisms and one checksum for each |
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271 addresses added to the whitelist. |
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272 |
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273 <I>option</I> <I>setting</I> |
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274 can only be in a DCC client <I>whiteclnt</I> file used by <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>, |
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275 <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B> or <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B>. Settings in per-user whiteclnt files |
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276 override settings in the global file. <I>Setting</I> can be any of the |
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277 following: |
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278 <I>option</I> <I>log-all</I> |
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279 to log all mail messages. |
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280 <I>option</I> <I>log-normal</I> |
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281 to log only messages that meet the logging thresholds. |
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282 <I>option</I> <I>log-subdirectory-day</I> |
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283 <I>option</I> <I>log-subdirectory-hour</I> |
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284 <I>option</I> <I>log-subdirectory-minute</I> |
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285 creates log files containing mail messages in subdirecto- |
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286 ries of the form <I>JJJ</I>, <I>JJJ/HH</I>, or <I>JJJ/HH/MM</I> where <I>JJJ</I> is the |
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287 current julian day, <I>HH</I> is the current hour, and <I>MM</I> is the |
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288 current minute. See also the <B>-l</B> <I>logdir</I> option for <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B>, |
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289 <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>, and <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B>. |
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290 <I>option</I> <I>dcc-on</I> |
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291 <I>option</I> <I>dcc-off</I> |
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292 Control DCC filtering. See the discussion of <B>-W</B> for |
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293 <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B> and <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>. |
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294 <I>option</I> <I>greylist-on</I> |
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295 <I>option</I> <I>greylist-off</I> |
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296 to control greylisting. Greylisting for other recipients |
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297 in the same SMTP transaction can still cause greylist tem- |
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298 porary rejections. <I>greylist-off</I> in the main whiteclnt |
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299 file. |
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300 <I>option</I> <I>greylist-log-on</I> |
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301 <I>option</I> <I>greylist-log-off</I> |
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302 to control logging of greylisted mail messages. |
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303 <I>option</I> <I>DCC-rep-off</I> |
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304 <I>option</I> <I>DCC-rep-on</I> |
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305 to honor or ignore DCC Reputations computed by the DCC |
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306 server. |
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307 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL1-off</I> |
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308 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL1-on</I> |
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309 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL2-off</I> |
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310 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL2-on</I> |
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311 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL3-off</I> |
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312 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL3-on</I> |
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313 honor or ignore results of DNS blacklist checks configured |
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314 with <B>-B</B> for <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>, and <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B>. |
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315 <I>option</I> <I>MTA-first</I> |
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316 <I>option</I> <I>MTA-last</I> |
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317 consider MTA determinations of spam or not-spam first so |
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318 they can be overridden by <I>whiteclnt</I> files, or last so that |
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319 they can override <I>whiteclnt</I> <I>files.</I> |
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320 <I>option</I> <I>forced-discard-ok</I> |
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321 <I>option</I> <I>no-forced-discard</I> |
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322 control whether <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B> and <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B> are allowed to dis- |
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323 card a message for one mailbox for which it is spam when it |
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324 is not spam and must be delivered to another mailbox. This |
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325 can happen if a mail message is addressed to two or more |
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326 mailboxes with differing whitelists. Discarding can be |
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327 undesirable because false positives are not communicated to |
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328 mail senders. To avoid discarding, <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B> and <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B> |
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329 running in proxy mode temporarily reject SMTP envelope <I>Rcpt</I> |
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330 <I>To</I> values that involve differing <I>whiteclnt</I> files. |
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331 <I>option</I> <I>threshold</I> <I>type,rej-thold</I> |
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332 has the same effects as <B>-c</B> <I>type,rej-thold</I> for <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B> or |
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333 <B>-t</B> <I>type,rej-thold</I> for <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B> and <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>. It is useful |
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334 only in per-user whiteclnt files to override the global DCC |
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335 checksum thresholds. |
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336 <I>option</I> <I>spam-trap-accept</I> |
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337 <I>option</I> <I>spam-trap-reject</I> |
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338 say that mail should be reported to the DCC server as |
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339 extremely bulk or with target counts of <I>MANY</I>. Greylisting, |
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340 DNS blacklist (DNSBL), and other checks are turned off. |
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341 <I>Spam-trap-accept</I> tells the MTA to accept the message while |
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342 <I>spam-trap-reject</I> tells the MTA to reject the message. Use |
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343 <I>Spam-trap-accept</I> for spam traps that should not be dis- |
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344 closed. <I>Spam-trap-reject</I> can be used on <I>catch-all</I> mail- |
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345 boxes that might receive legitimate mail by typographical |
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346 errors and that senders should be told about. |
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347 |
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348 In the absence of explicit settings, the default in the main |
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349 whiteclnt file is equivalent to |
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350 <I>option</I> <I>log-normal</I> |
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351 <I>option</I> <I>dcc-on</I> |
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352 <I>option</I> <I>greylist-on</I> |
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353 <I>option</I> <I>greylist-log-on</I> |
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354 <I>option</I> <I>DCC-rep-off</I> |
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355 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL1-off</I> |
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356 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL2-off</I> |
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357 <I>option</I> <I>DNSBL3-off</I> |
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358 <I>MTA-last</I> |
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359 <I>option</I> <I>no-forced-discard</I> |
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360 The defaults for individual recipient <I>whiteclnt</I> files are the |
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361 same except as change by explicit settings in the main file. |
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362 |
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363 Checksums of the IP address of the SMTP client sending a mail message are |
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364 practically unforgeable, because it is impractical for an SMTP client to |
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365 "spoof" its address or pretend to use some other IP address. That would |
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366 make the IP address of the sender useful for whitelisting, except that |
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367 the IP address of the SMTP client is often not available to users of |
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368 <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B>. In addition, legitimate mail relays make whitelist entries |
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369 for IP addresses of little use. For example, the IP address from which a |
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370 message arrived might be that of a local relay instead of the home |
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371 address of a whitelisted mailing list. |
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372 |
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373 Envelope and header <I>From</I> values can be forged, so whitelist entries for |
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374 their checksums are not entirely reliable. |
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375 |
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376 Checksums of <I>env</I><B>_</B><I>To</I> values are never sent to DCC servers. They are valid |
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377 in only <I>whiteclnt</I> files and used only by <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>, and |
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378 <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B> when the envelope <I>Rcpt</I> <I>To</I> value is known. |
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379 |
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380 <A NAME="Greylists"><B>Greylists</B></A> |
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381 The DCC server, <B><A HREF="dccd.html">dccd(8)</A></B>, can be used to maintain a greylist database for |
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382 some DCC clients including <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B> and <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>. Greylisting involves |
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383 temporarily refusing mail from unfamiliar SMTP clients and is unrelated |
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384 to filtering with a Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse. |
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385 See http://projects.puremagic.com/greylisting/ |
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386 |
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387 <A NAME="Privacy"><B>Privacy</B></A> |
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388 Because sending mail is a less private act than receiving it, and because |
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389 sending bulk mail is usually not private at all and cannot be very pri- |
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390 vate, the DCC tries first to protect the privacy of mail recipients, and |
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391 second the privacy of senders of mail that is not bulk. |
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392 |
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393 DCC clients necessarily disclose some information about mail they have |
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394 received. The DCC database contains checksums of mail bodies, header |
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395 lines, and source addresses. While it contains significantly less infor- |
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396 mation than is available by "snooping" on Internet links, it is important |
|
397 that the DCC database be treated as containing sensitive information and |
|
398 to not put the most private information in the DCC database. Given the |
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399 contents of a message, one might determine whether that message has been |
|
400 received by a system that subscribes to the DCC. Guesses about the |
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401 sender and addressee of a message can also be validated if the checksums |
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402 of the message have been sent to a DCC server. |
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403 |
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404 Because the DCC is distributed, organizations can operate their own DCC |
|
405 servers, and configure them to share or "flood" only the checksums of |
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406 bulk mail that is not in local whitelists. |
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407 |
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408 DCC clients should not report the checksums of messages known to be pri- |
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409 vate to a DCC server. For example, checksums of messages local to a sys- |
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410 tem or that are otherwise known a priori to not be unsolicited bulk |
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411 should not be sent to a remote DCC server. This can accomplished by |
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412 adding entries for the sender to the client's local whitelist file. |
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413 Client whitelist files can also include entries for email recipients |
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414 whose mail should not be reported to a DCC server. |
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415 |
|
416 <A NAME="Security"><B>Security</B></A> |
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417 Whenever considering security, one must first consider the risks. The |
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418 worst DCC security problems are unauthorized commands to a DCC service, |
|
419 denial of the DCC service, and corruption of DCC data. The worst that |
|
420 can be done with remote commands to a DCC server is to turn it off or |
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421 otherwise cause it to stop responding. The DCC is designed to fail |
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422 gracefully, so that a denial of service attack would at worst allow |
|
423 delivery of mail that would otherwise be rejected. Corruption of DCC |
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424 data might at worst cause mail that is already somewhat "bulk" by virtue |
|
425 of being received by two or more people to appear have higher recipient |
|
426 numbers. Since DCC users <I>must</I> whitelist all sources of legitimate bulk |
|
427 mail, this is also not a concern. Such security risks should be |
|
428 addressed, but only with defenses that don't cost more than the possible |
|
429 damage from an attack. |
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430 |
|
431 The DCC must contend with senders of unsolicited bulk mail who resort to |
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432 unlawful actions to express their displeasure at having their advertising |
|
433 blocked. Because the DCC protocol is based on UDP, an unhappy advertiser |
|
434 could try to flood a DCC server with packets supposedly from subscribers |
|
435 or non-subscribers. DCC servers defend against that attack by rate-lim- |
|
436 iting requests from anonymous users. |
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437 |
|
438 Also because of the use of UDP, clients must be protected against forged |
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439 answers to their queries. Otherwise an unsolicited bulk mail advertiser |
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440 could send a stream of "not spam" answers to an SMTP client while simul- |
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441 taneously sending mail that would otherwise be rejected. This is not a |
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442 problem for authenticated clients of the DCC because they share a secret |
|
443 with the DCC. Unauthenticated, anonymous DCC clients do not share any |
|
444 secrets with the DCC, except for unique and unpredictable bits in each |
|
445 query or report sent to the DCC. Therefore, DCC servers cryptographi- |
|
446 cally sign answers to unauthenticated clients with bits from the corre- |
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447 sponding queries. This protects against attackers that do not have |
|
448 access to the stream of packets from the DCC client. |
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449 |
|
450 The passwords or shared secrets used in the DCC client and server pro- |
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451 grams are "cleartext" for several reasons. In any shared secret authen- |
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452 tication system, at least one party must know the secret or keep the |
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453 secret in cleartext. You could encrypt the secrets in a file, but |
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454 because they are used by programs, you would need a cleartext copy of the |
|
455 key to decrypt the file somewhere in the system, making such a scheme |
|
456 more expensive but no more secure than a file of cleartext passwords. |
|
457 Asymmetric systems such as that used in UNIX allow one party to not know |
|
458 the secrets, but they must be and are designed to be computationally |
|
459 expensive when used in applications like the DCC that involve thousands |
|
460 or more authentication checks per second. Moreover, because of "dictio- |
|
461 nary attacks," asymmetric systems are now little more secure than keeping |
|
462 passwords in cleartext. An adversary can compare the hash values of com- |
|
463 binations of common words with /etc/passwd hash values to look for bad |
|
464 passwords. Worse, by the nature of a client/server protocol like that |
|
465 used in the DCC, clients must have the cleartext password. Since it is |
|
466 among the more numerous and much less secure clients that adversaries |
|
467 would seek files of DCC passwords, it would be a waste to complicate the |
|
468 DCC server with an asymmetric system. |
|
469 |
|
470 The DCC protocol is vulnerable to dictionary attacks to recover pass- |
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471 words. An adversary could capture some DCC packets, and then check to |
|
472 see if any of the 100,000 to 1,000,000 passwords in so called "cracker |
|
473 dictionaries" applied to a packet generated the same signature. This is |
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474 a concern only if DCC passwords are poorly chosen, such as any combina- |
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475 tion of words in an English dictionary. There are ways to prevent this |
|
476 vulnerability regardless of how badly passwords are chosen, but they are |
|
477 computationally expensive and require additional network round trips. |
|
478 Since DCC passwords are created and typed into files once and do not need |
|
479 to be remembered by people, it is cheaper and quite easy to simply choose |
|
480 good passwords that are not in dictionaries. |
|
481 |
|
482 <A NAME="Reliability"><B>Reliability</B></A> |
|
483 It is better to fail to filter unsolicited bulk mail than to fail to |
|
484 deliver legitimate mail, so DCC clients fail in the direction of assuming |
|
485 that mail is legitimate or even whitelisted. |
|
486 |
|
487 A DCC client sends a report or other request and waits for an answer. If |
|
488 no answer arrives within a reasonable time, the client retransmits. |
|
489 There are many things that might result in the client not receiving an |
|
490 answer, but the most important is packet loss. If the client's request |
|
491 does not reach the server, it is easy and harmless for the client to |
|
492 retransmit. If the client's request reached the server but the server's |
|
493 response was lost, a retransmission to the same server would be misunder- |
|
494 stood as a new report of another copy of the same message unless it is |
|
495 detected as a retransmission by the server. The DCC protocol includes |
|
496 transactions identifiers for this purpose. If the client retransmitted |
|
497 to a second server, the retransmission would be misunderstood by the sec- |
|
498 ond server as a new report of the same message. |
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499 |
|
500 Each request from a client includes a timestamp to aid the client in mea- |
|
501 suring the round trip time to the server and to let the client pick the |
|
502 closest server. Clients monitor the speed of all of the servers they |
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503 know including those they are not currently using, and use the quickest. |
|
504 |
|
505 <A NAME="Client-and-Server-IDs"><B>Client and Server-IDs</B></A> |
|
506 Servers and clients use numbers or IDs to identify themselves. ID 1 is |
|
507 reserved for anonymous, unauthenticated clients. All other IDs are asso- |
|
508 ciated with a pair of passwords in the <I>ids</I> file, the current and next or |
|
509 previous and current passwords. Clients included their client IDs in |
|
510 their messages. When they are not using the anonymous ID, they sign |
|
511 their messages to servers with the first password associated with their |
|
512 client-ID. Servers treat messages with signatures that match neither of |
|
513 the passwords for the client-ID in their own <I>ids</I> file as if the client |
|
514 had used the anonymous ID. |
|
515 |
|
516 Each server has a unique <I>server-ID</I> less than 32768. Servers use their |
|
517 IDs to identify checksums that they <I>flood</I> to other servers. Each server |
|
518 expects local clients sending administrative commands to use the server's |
|
519 ID and sign administrative commands with the associated password. |
|
520 |
|
521 Server-IDs must be unique among all systems that share reports by "flood- |
|
522 ing." All servers must be told of the IDs all other servers whose |
|
523 reports can be received in the local <I>@prefix@/flod</I> file described in |
|
524 <B><A HREF="dccd.html">dccd(8)</A></B>. However, server-IDs can be mapped during flooding between inde- |
|
525 pendent DCC organizations. |
|
526 |
|
527 <I>Passwd-IDs</I> are server-IDs that should not be assigned to servers. They |
|
528 appear in the often publicly readable <I>@prefix@/flod</I> and specify passwords |
|
529 in the private <I>@prefix@/ids</I> file for the inter-server flooding protocol |
|
530 |
|
531 The client identified by a <I>client-ID</I> might be a single computer with a |
|
532 single IP address, a single but multi-homed computer, or many computers. |
|
533 Client-IDs are not used to identify checksum reports, but the organiza- |
|
534 tion operating the client. A client-ID need only be unique among clients |
|
535 using a single server. A single client can use different client-IDs for |
|
536 different servers, each client-ID authenticated with a separate password. |
|
537 |
|
538 An obscure but important part of all of this is that the inter-server |
|
539 flooding algorithm depends on server-IDs and timestamps attached to |
|
540 reports of checksums. The inter-server flooding mechanism requires coop- |
|
541 erating DCC servers to maintain reasonable clocks ticking in UTC. |
|
542 Clients include timestamps in their requests, but as long as their time- |
|
543 stamps are unlikely to be repeated, they need not be very accurate. |
|
544 |
|
545 <A NAME="Installation-Considerations"><B>Installation Considerations</B></A> |
|
546 DCC clients on a computer share information about which servers are cur- |
|
547 rently working and their speeds in a shared memory segment. This segment |
|
548 also contains server host names, IP addresses, and the passwords needed |
|
549 to authenticate known clients to servers. That generally requires that |
|
550 <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>, and <B><A HREF="cdcc.html">cdcc(8)</A></B> execute with an UID that can |
|
551 write to the DCC home directory and its files. The sendmail interface, |
|
552 dccm, is a daemon that can be started by an "rc" or other script already |
|
553 running with the correct UID. The other two, dccproc and cdcc need to be |
|
554 set-UID because they are used by end users. They relinquish set-UID |
|
555 privileges when not needed. |
|
556 |
|
557 Files that contain cleartext passwords including the shared file used by |
|
558 clients must be readable only by "owner." |
|
559 |
|
560 The data files required by a DCC can be in a single "home" directory, |
|
561 <I>@prefix@</I>. Distinct DCC servers can run on a single computer, provided |
|
562 they use distinct UDP port numbers and home directories. It is possible |
|
563 and convenient for the DCC clients using a server on the same computer to |
|
564 use the same home directory as the server. |
|
565 |
|
566 The DCC source distribution includes sample control files. They should |
|
567 be modified appropriately and then copied to the DCC home directory. |
|
568 Files that contain cleartext passwords must not be publicly readable. |
|
569 |
|
570 The DCC source includes "feature" m4 files to configure sendmail to use |
|
571 <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B> to check a DCC server about incoming mail. |
|
572 |
|
573 See also the <A HREF="INSTALL.html">INSTALL.html</A> file. |
|
574 |
|
575 <A NAME="Client-Installation"><B>Client Installation</B></A> |
|
576 Installing a DCC client starts with obtaining or compiling program bina- |
|
577 ries for the client server data control tool, <B><A HREF="cdcc.html">cdcc(8)</A></B>. Installing the |
|
578 sendmail DCC interface, <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B>, or <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B>, the general or |
|
579 <B>procmail(1)</B> interface is the main part of the client installation. Con- |
|
580 necting the DCC to sendmail with dccm is most powerful, but requires |
|
581 administrative control of the system running sendmail. |
|
582 |
|
583 As noted above, cdcc and dccproc should be set-UID to a suitable UID. |
|
584 Root or 0 is thought to be safe for both, because they are careful to |
|
585 release privileges except when they need them to read or write files in |
|
586 the DCC home directory. A DCC home directory, <I>@prefix@</I> should be cre- |
|
587 ated. It must be owned and writable by the UID to which cdcc is set. |
|
588 |
|
589 After the DCC client programs have been obtained, contact the operator(s) |
|
590 of the chosen DCC server(s) to obtain each server's hostname, port num- |
|
591 ber, and a <I>client-ID</I> and corresponding password. No client-IDs or pass- |
|
592 words are needed touse DCC servers that allow anonymous clients. Use the |
|
593 <I>load</I> or <I>add</I> commands of cdcc to create a <I>map</I> file in the DCC home direc- |
|
594 tory. It is usually necessary to create a client whitelist file of the |
|
595 format described above. To accommodate users sharing a computer but not |
|
596 ideas about what is solicited bulk mail, the client whitelist file can be |
|
597 any valid path name and need not be in the DCC home directory. |
|
598 |
|
599 If dccm is chosen, arrange to start it with suitable arguments before |
|
600 sendmail is started. See the <I>homedir/dcc</I><B>_</B><I>conf</I> file and the <I>misc/rcDCC</I> |
|
601 script in the DCC source. The procmail DCCM interface, <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B>, can |
|
602 be run manually or by a <B>procmailrc(5)</B> rule. |
|
603 |
|
604 <A NAME="Server-Installation"><B>Server Installation</B></A> |
|
605 The DCC server, <B><A HREF="dccd.html">dccd(8)</A></B>, also requires that the DCC home directory exist. |
|
606 It does not use the client shared or memory mapped file of server |
|
607 addresses, but it requires other files. One is the <I>@prefix@/ids</I> file of |
|
608 client-IDs, server-IDs, and corresponding passwords. Another is a <I>flod</I> |
|
609 file of peers that send and receive floods of reports of checksums with |
|
610 large counts. Both files are described in <B><A HREF="dccd.html">dccd(8)</A></B>. |
|
611 |
|
612 The server daemon should be started when the system is rebooted, probably |
|
613 before sendmail. See the <I>misc/rcDCC</I> and <I>misc/start-dccd</I> files in the DCC |
|
614 source. |
|
615 |
|
616 The database should be cleaned regularly with <B><A HREF="dbclean.html">dbclean(8)</A></B> such as by run- |
|
617 ning the crontab job that is in the misc directory. |
|
618 |
|
619 |
|
620 </PRE> |
|
621 <H2><A NAME="SEE-ALSO">SEE ALSO</A></H2><PRE> |
|
622 <B><A HREF="cdcc.html">cdcc(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dbclean.html">dbclean(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dcc.html">dcc(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccd.html">dccd(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccifd.html">dccifd(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccm.html">dccm(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccproc.html">dccproc(8)</A></B>, |
|
623 <B><A HREF="dblist.html">dblist(8)</A></B>, <B><A HREF="dccsight.html">dccsight(8)</A></B>, <B>sendmail(8)</B>. |
|
624 |
|
625 |
|
626 </PRE> |
|
627 <H2><A NAME="HISTORY">HISTORY</A></H2><PRE> |
|
628 Distributed Checksum Clearinghouses are based on an idea of Paul Vixie |
|
629 with code designed and written at Rhyolite Software starting in 2000. |
|
630 This document describes version 1.3.103. |
|
631 |
|
632 February 26, 2009 |
|
633 </PRE> |
|
634 <HR> |
|
635 <ADDRESS> |
|
636 Man(1) output converted with |
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637 <a href="http://www.oac.uci.edu/indiv/ehood/man2html.html">man2html</a> |
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638 modified for the DCC $Date 2001/04/29 03:22:18 $ |
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639 <BR> |
|
640 <A HREF="http://www.dcc-servers.net/dcc/"> |
|
641 <IMG SRC="http://logos.dcc-servers.net/border.png" |
|
642 class=logo ALT="DCC logo"> |
|
643 </A> |
|
644 <A HREF="http://validator.w3.org/check?uri=referer"> |
|
645 <IMG class=logo ALT="Valid HTML 4.01 Strict" |
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646 SRC="http://www.w3.org/Icons/valid-html401"> |
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647 </A> |
|
648 </ADDRESS> |
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649 </BODY> |
|
650 </HTML> |